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Comments
Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Community
Notification Law: Will It Protect Communities
from Repeat Sex Offenders?
INTRODUCTION
On July 29, 1994, Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old first-grader
from Hamilton Township, New Jersey, was walking home from a
friend's house when Jesse Timmendequas ("Timmendequas),
Megan's thirty-three-year-old neighbor, invited her into his
house to pet his new puppy.' Once inside, Timmendequas led
Megan to his upstairs bedroom, strangled her unconscious with
a belt, raped her and asphyxiated her to death with a plastic
bag.2 Timmendequas then placed Megan's body in a box, drove
to a nearby soccer field and dumped her body in some bushes.'
Unknown to Megan's parents and their neighbors,
Timmendequas was a twice-convicted felon who had served six
years for the attempted sexual assault of a child.' Furthermore,
Timmendequas' two housemates had also served time for sex
crimes.' Why, the residents of Hamilton Township wondered,
1. Richard Jerome et al., Megan's Legacy, PEOPLE, Mar. 20, 1995, at 46. See
also Ralph Siegel, Suspect Admits Killing Girl, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Aug.
2, 1994, at A-1.
2. Jerome, supra note 1, at 46. Timmendequas signed a statement admitting
to the crime after investigators found scraps of Megan's shorts in his house the day
after her disappearance. Siegel, supra note 1, at A-1.
3. Jerome, supra note 1, at 46. When Timmendequas realized the local police
were searching the neighborhood with dogs, he washed the steps to his house and
his truck with ammonia. Siegel, supra note 1, at A-1.
4. Siegel, supra note 1, at A-1.
5. Id. See also Stephen W. Dill, Pink Ribbons Symbolize Drive for "Megan's
635
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 34:635
had they not been told? Megan's parents and their neighbors
soon launched an angry grass roots campaign calling for legisla-
tion that would require authorities to notify residents when a
convicted sex offender moved into their communities.6
Their pleas fell on receptive ears inside New Jersey's legisla-
ture. In less than twenty days after Megan's murder, the New
Jersey Assembly and Senate introduced a plethora of measures
to deal more harshly with sex offenders, two of which required
authorities to notify communities about the release of certain
sex offenders from prison.7 The proposed community notification
law was modeled after a similar law adopted by the State of
Washington, the Community Protection Act.8 On October 31,
Law," RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Aug. 3, 1994, at A-3. The three men met when
they were inmates at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center at Avenel, New
Jersey's institution for compulsive sex offenders. Id.
6. Dill, supra note 5, at A-3.
7. See N.J.A. 85, 206th Leg., lst Sess. (1994); N.J.S. 14, 206th Leg., 1st Sess.
(1994). The New Jersey Assembly measures also included mandatory life sentences
for certain repeat sex offenders, N.J.A. 256, 206th Leg., lst Ses. (1994), a sex of-
fender registration law, N.J.A. 84, 206th Leg., 1st Sess. (1994), involuntary confine-
ment for certain sex offenders after serving their sentences, N.J.A. 86, 206th Leg.,
lst Sess. (1994), the creation of a sex offenders' DNA data bank, N.J.A. 1592, 206th
Leg., 1st Sess. (1994), mandatory minimum sentences for certain repeat sex offend-
ers, N.J.A. 82, 206th Leg., 1st Sess. (1994), and a task force to study the treatment
of sex offenders sent to the institution for compulsive sex offenders, N.J.A. Con. Res.
8, 206th Leg., lt Sess. (1994). See also Ivette Mendez, Sex Crime Package Voted by
Assembly, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 30, 1994, at 1.
The New Jersey Senate measures paralleled the Assembly measures, but
the Senate also introduced a provision that would eliminate certain sex offenders
from eligibility for early release if they refused to participate in therapy during their
prison sentences. N.J.S. 15, 206th Leg., 1st Seas. (1994). See also Michelle Ruess,
Senate Passes Sex-Offender Crackdown, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Oct. 4, 1994,
at A-3.
8. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130 (West Supp. 1995).
Sex offender registration laws are more common than community notification
laws. Most states have passed sex offender registration statutes. See ALA. CODE
§ 13A-11-200 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010, 18.65.087 (1994); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-3821, 13-4501(B) (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-901 (Michie 1994); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 290-290.7 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412.5 (West
1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-102r (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (1994);
FLA. STAT. ch. 775.21 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1 (1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-
8301 to -8311 (1995); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 730, para. 150/1 (1995); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 5-2-12-1 to -13 (Burns Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4902 to -4909 (1995);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.510 (Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:540-:549
(West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11003, 11004 (West 1994); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 22C, § 37 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (1995); MiSS.
CODE ANN. § 45-33-1 (1995); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.600 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 46-23-501 to -507 (1994); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 207.151-.157 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 632-A:12 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2950.01 (Baldwin 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-587 (West 1995); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 181.508, 181.518 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-16 (1994); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAws ANN. §§ 22-22-30 to -39 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to -108
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1994, three months after Megan's brutal death, New Jersey's
Governor, Christine Todd Whitman, signed the package into
law-"Megan's Law."9
Pennsylvania followed the lead of New Jersey. The Pennsylva-
nia House of Representatives, in a unanimous 198-0 vote, passed
without debate the final draft of Pennsylvania's version of
Megan's Law, Senate Bill 7 (the "Pennsylvania statute"),10 on
October 17, 1995.11 Governor Tom Ridge signed the legislation
into law one week later, on October 24, 1995.12
This comment argues that Pennsylvania's community notifica-
tion law will not protect communities from repeat sex offenders.
This comment first provides a summary of Pennsylvania's stat-
ute and its pertinent community notification provisions. Because
Pennsylvania's statute will operate in much the same way as
New Jersey's Megan's Law, this comment reviews recent New
Jersey court decisions that reveal several constitutional weak-
nesses with community notification laws. This comment then
presents several policy arguments showing that community
notification laws will not prevent released sex offenders from
committing further sex crimes. Finally, this comment argues
that rehabilitation is the most realistic means to protect commu-
nities from repeat sex offenders.
(1994); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 6252-13c.1 (West 1995); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1-.3, 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1995);
W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8F-1 to -8 (1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.45 (1995); WYO. STAT.
§ 7-19-301 (1995). Only the following states provide for some form of community
notification in their statutes: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia.
The following states, including the District of Columbia, have neither regis-
tration nor community notification laws: Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Nebras-
ka, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Vermont.
9. See Registration and Notification of Release of Certain Offenders Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1995). See also Joseph F. Sullivan, Whitman Ap-
proves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at B-1.
10. Act No. 1995-24, 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. 552 (Purdon) (to be codified at 42
PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9791-9799.5).
11. Mario F. Cattabiani, Pa. Legislators OK Megan's Law, ALLENTOWN MORN-
ING CALL, Oct. 18, 1995, at A-1. The bill's main sponsor was Senator Stewart J.
Greenleaf (R-12th Dist.), the influential Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee. He is considered by many to be the Republicans' leading person on crime and
judicial matters. See GUIDEBOOK TO PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATORS 1995-1996 30-31
(Lynelle Jolley ed. 1995). Senator Greenleaf chaired the Senate impeachment panel
that heard evidence against former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen.
Id.
12. Stephanie Ebbert, Ridge Lauds Effort to Create Megan's Law, HARRISBURG
PATRIOT, Oct. 25, 1995, at B-3. Governor Ridge was flanked by the bill's sponsors
and children from the Magic Years Childcare and Learning Center in East
Peensboro Township, Pennsylvania as he signed the legislation. Id.
1996
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PENNSYLVANIA'S COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAW
The most important provisions of Pennsylvania's statute re-
quire police authorities to release information about a special
category of sex offenders, statutorily defined as "sexually violent
predators,"' 3 to certain segments of the community when the
sex offenders are about to be released from custody." The basic
policy goal of the statute is to protect the safety of the general
public from repeat sex offenders."5 The Pennsylvania General
Assembly focused on community notification as the primary
means to achieve this goal for several stated reasons. The legis-
lature found that if the general public is provided with adequate
notice and information about "sexually violent predators," the
community could develop constructive plans to prepare them-
selves and their children for the offender's release from custo-
dy.'" The legislature also found that it is an important govern-
mental interest to protect the general public from "sexually vio-
lent predators" because they often commit repeated sex crimes
after release from incarceration. " The general public's lack of
knowledge concerning the penal and mental health components
of the state justice system was also an important consideration
for the legislature."5 Finally, the legislature found that certain
13. The statute defines a "sexually violent predator" as a person likely to
engage in predatory sexually violent offenses due to a mental abnormality or person-
ality disorder. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 553, § 9792. A "mental abnormality" is fur-
ther defined as "a congenital or acquired condition of a person that affects the emo-
tional or Volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that person
to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a men-
ace to the health and safety of other persons." Id. "Predatory" is defined as "an act
directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has been established
or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization." Id.
14. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 556-57, §§ 9797, 9798. The statute also contains
provisions that would require certain sex offenders not deemed "sexually violent
predators" to register all current and future addresses with authorities for a period
of ten years upon commencement of parole or probation. Id. § 9793(a). If a released
sex offender is determined to be a "sexually violent predator," the registration re-
quirements continue until the person is no longer determined to be a "sexually vio-
lent predator." Id. § 9795(a). The registration requirements of the statute, however,
are not the focus of this comment.
15. Id. § 9791(b). In § 9791(b), the legislature also stated that the statute
.shall not be construed as punitive." Id. This is an attempt by the legislature to pre-
vent future constitutional attacks against the statute which claim that the social
stigma of community notification constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment." See
infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the issue of whether
legislatures can simply declare a statute punitive or regulatory.
16. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 552-53, § 9791(a)(1).
17. Id. § 9791(a)(2). See infra note 119 and accompanying text for a discussion
that questions the assumption that sex offenders have a higher rate of recidivism
than other criminals.
18. See 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 553, § 9791(aX3).
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sex offenders, especially "sexually violent predators," have a
reduced expectation of privacy because protecting the general
public from their crimes is of greater importance.'9
Only those sex offenders deemed "sexually violent predators"
will be subject to the community notification provisions of the
statute. There are two prerequisites for a sex offender to be
classified as a "sexually violent predator." First, an individual
must be convicted of one of the following crimes that are clas-
sified as felonies and the victim must be a minor: kidnapping
(except by a parent)," rape,2' involuntary deviate sexual inter-
course,22 aggravated indecent assault," prostitution and relat-
* 19. Id. § 9791(a)(5).
20. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides that:
A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another a substan-
tial distance under the circumstances from the place where he is found, or if
he unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a place of isolation,
with any of the following intentions:
(1) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage.
(2) To facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter.
(3) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another.
(4) To interfere with the performance by public officials of any govern-
mental or political function.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2901(a) (1991).
21. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides that:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual
intercourse with another person not his spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a
person of reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious; or
(4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapa-
ble of consent.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (1991).
The Crimes Code states that "[slexual intercourse[,] ... [i]n addition to its
ordinary meaning, includes intercourse per os or per anus, with some penetration
however slight; emission is not required." Id. § 3101.
22. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides that:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with another person:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a
person of reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious;
(4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapa-
ble of consent; or
(5) who is less than 16 years of age.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3123 (1991).
The Crimes Code defines "deviate sexual intercourse" as [slexual intercourse
per os or per anus between human beings who are not husband and wife.. .. The
term also includes penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of another
person with a foreign object for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic
or law enforcement procedures." Id. § 3101.
23. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides:
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ed offenses,24 or distribution of obscene and other sexual mate-
rials and performances. 5 Persons convicted of the following
crimes also meet the first prerequisite of being classified a "sex-
ually violent predator" regardless of the victim's age: rape, devi-
ate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault, or spousal
sexual assault.2" The community notification provisions of the
statute will only apply to "sexually violent predators" who have
A person commits a felony of the second degree when he engages in penetra-
tion, however slight, of the genitals or anus of another with a part of the
actor's body for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law
enforcement procedures if:
(1) he does so without the consent of the other person;
(2) he knows that the other person suffers from a mental disease or
defect which renders him or her incapable of appraising the nature of
his or her conduct;
(3) he knows that the other person is unaware that the indecent contact
is being committed;
(4) he has substantially impaired the other person's power to appraise
or control his or her conduct by administering or employing without the
knowledge of the other drugs, intoxicants or other means for the pur-
pose of preventing resistance;
(5) the other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or
other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority
over him; or
(6) he is over 18 years of age and the other person is under 14 years of
age.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3125 (1991).
24. The only acts that constitute a felony with regard to prostitution are those
where an actor promotes prostitution, compels another to engage in or promote pros-
titution, promotes prostitution of a child under the age of 16 years, or promotes
prostitution of a spouse, child, ward or any person for whose care, protection or
support the actor is responsible. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902 (1991). An individu-
al who is convicted of -being a prostitute or soliciting or procuring a prostitute is
only guilty of a misdemeanor. Id.
25. Section 5903 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code makes it a crime to dis-
play, sell, distribute, design or publish obscene materials or performances. 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5903(a)(1)-(6) (1991). Any material or performance is obscene if.
(1) the average person applying contemporary community standards would find
that the subject matter taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest;
(2) the subject matter depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct of a type described in this section; and
(3) the subject matter, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, educational or scientific value.
Id. § 5903(a)(1)-(3).
Section 5903 also makes it a crime to knowingly sell or otherwise provide
minors with explicit sexual materials, or to knowingly admit minors to performances
that depict nudity or sexual conduct. Id. § 5903.
The above crimes are only felonies if the actor has been previously convicted
of these crimes. Id.
26. Section 3128 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code states that a person com-
mits a felony of the second degree when he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate
sexual intercourse with that person's spouse: "(1) by forcible compulsion; (2) by
threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable
resolution; or (3) who is unconscious." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3128(a)-(b) (1991).
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been convicted of one of the specified crimes after October 24,
1995, the effective date of the legislation. 7
The second prerequisite for a sex offender to be classified as a
"sexually violent predator" involves an assessment by a newly
created board of experts, called the State Board to Assess Sexu-
ally Violent Predators (the "Board").2 ' The Board is composed of
one psychiatrist and one psychologist appointed by the Gover-
nor, and one criminal justice expert appointed by the Attorney
General. After being convicted of one of the above crimes, but
before sentencing, the sex offender must be assessed by the
Board.0 The Board's assessment will include, but not be limit-
ed to, the following factors: the offender's age, the offender's
prior criminal record, the victim's age, whether the offense in-
volved multiple victims, use of illegal drugs by the offender,
whether the offender completed any prior sentences and partici-
pated in programs for sex offenders, the offender's mental condi-
tion, the nature of the offender's sexual contact with the victim,
whether the offender displayed unusual cruelty during the com-
mission of the crime, and any behavioral characteristics that
contributed to the offender's conduct."1 It is important to note,
however, that an individual convicted of one of the designated
crimes must be presumed by the Board to be a "sexually violent
predator," which can only be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.2 The Board has thirty days to submit
its findings to the trial court in which the sex offender was con-
27. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 559, § 9799.5. The basic registration requirements
of the statute apply to all sex offenders convicted of an appropriate sex offense, re-
gardless of the date of their conviction, as long as the offender remains under the
jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole or the Department of
Corrections. Id.
28. Id. §§ 9794, 9799.3.
29. Id. Each of these professionals must have a minimum of ten years expe-
rience and specialized training in the behavior and treatment of sex offenders. Id.
§ 9799.3(a). Members of the Board will serve four year terms and be compensated
$125 per day, plus expenses, while performing the business of the Board. Id.
§ 9799.3(c)-(d).
30. Id. § 9794(a).
31. Id. § 9794(c)(1)-(10). The statute does not contain any provisions that allow
the sex offender to participate during the Board's assessment process. Apparently,
the Board will make its assessment without the sex offender even being present.
32. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 554, § 9794(b). Clear and convincing proof is
defined as proof which requires more than a preponderance of the evidence, the
standard of proof in most civil proceedings, but less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the standard of proof in criminal proceedings. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 251
(6th ed. 1990). See also In re Sylvester, 555 A.2d 1202, 1203-04 (Pa. 1989) (stating
that the standard of clear and convincing evidence means evidence that is so clear,
direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear con-




Upon receipt of the Board's findings, the court will then make
the final determination of whether the sex offender is a "sexual-
ly violent predator" during a special hearing prior to sentenc-
ing.3 During this proceeding, the sex offender has the right to
legal counsel, and both the offender and the district attorney
have the right to call witnesses and experts and to cross-exam-
ine witnesses." As with the Board's assessment process, the
trial court is to presume that the offender is a "sexually violent
predator."' If an offender is determined to be a "sexually vio-
lent predator," the offender may appeal that decision no sooner
than one year prior to release, or in five year intervals thereaf-
ter.37
Once the trial court has classified the sex offender as a "sexu-
ally violent predator," the offender must register all current ad-
dresses with the Pennsylvania State Police upon release, parole,
or probation." The "sexually violent predator" has a continuing
obligation to inform authorities of any address changes within
ten days.39 The offender must also provide fingerprints and a
photograph at the time of sentencing.' Any "sexually violent
predator" who fails to follow the registration requirements of the
statute commits a felony of the third degree." The statute also
contains verification provisions.2 Every ninety days, the Pen-
nsylvania State Police are required to send a non-forwardable
verification form to the offender's last reported address, which
the offender must return within ten days. 3 If the Sex offender
fails to return the verification form within ten days, the Penn-
33. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 555, § 9794(d).
34. Id. § 9794(e).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 9794(b).
37. Id. § 9794(f). The appeal must be filed with the court that made the origi-
nal determination. Id. If the trial court chooses to reconsider the initial determina-
tion, it can request a new assessment by the Board. Id.
38. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 555, § 9795(a). The registration requirements of §
9795(a) continue unless the court that made the original "sexually violent predator'
determination reverses its decision. Id.
39. Id. § 9795(b)(2)-(3).
40. Id. § 9795(b)(4).
41. Id. § 9795(d). The Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides that a person con-
victed of a felony of the third degree may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term
of not more than seven years. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103(3) (1991).
42. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 556, § 9796.
43. Id. § 9796(a). Offenders not deemed "sexually violent predators," but sub-
ject to the 10-year registration requirements of § 9793, are required to complete and
return within ten days an annual residence verification form to be provided by the
Pennsylvania State Police. Id. § 9796(b).
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sylvania State Police are required to immediately notify the local
police department, which must locate and arrest the offender."
The statute specifies which segments of the general public are
to receive information about the release of "sexually violent
predators." Within three days after the offender registers with
the Pennsylvania State Police or registers a change of address,
the local municipal police department, or the State Police if no
local police department exists, must give written notice to the
offender's victim.45 The notice must contain the offender's name
and address.4
The local police or State Police are also required to inform the
neighbors of the "sexually violent predator's" location within
three days of receiving the offender's information.47 In addition
to neighbors, the authorities are also required to provide infor-
mation to the following entities within seven days of receiving
the offender's information: the director of the Children and
Youth Services Agency in the county where the offender resides,
the superintendent of each school district and the equivalent
official of each private and parochial school enrolling students
up through the twelfth grade in the municipality, the director of
each licensed day care center and preschool program in the mu-
nicipality, and the president of each college, university, and
community college located within 1,000 feet of the offender's
address." The neighbors and the above entities must be noti-
fied of the offender's name and address, the offender's convicted
offense, and a statement that the offender has been designated
as a "sexually violent predator.' 9 Because the legislature real-
ized the potential problem of the general public taking the law
into its own hands, the statute also contains provisions that
44. Id. § 9796(d). If the local municipality does not have a police department,
the State Police must assume the responsibility for locating and arresting the offend-
er. Id.
45. Id. § 9797(a)(1).
46. Id. The victim may terminate the right to receive notification by providing
the local police department with a written statement releasing the agency from the
duty of providing notification. Id. § 9797(a)(2).
47. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 557, § 9798(b)(1). The proposed statute does not
define "neighbors," nor does it give any indication whether "neighbors" means only
next door neighbors or neighbors within the same block. Apparently, the exact mean-
ing and scope of "neighbors" is for the Pennsylvania State Police to determine as
part of its duty to develop regulations regarding community notification. Id.
§ 9799.1(2), (3), (5).
48. Id. § 9798(b)(2)-(5). All the information required by this section must also
be made available to any member of the public who requests it. Id. § 9798(d).
49. Id. § 9798(a)(1). The notice provided to these parties must not include any




require the Pennsylvania State Police to develop guidelines
concerning the proper use of the information."
The statute also calls for lifetime parole for an offender deter-
mined to be a "sexually violent predator.""1 The lifetime parole
continues unless the court that made the original determination
decides the offender is no longer a "sexually violent predator." 2
The statute also requires the "sexually violent predator" to at-
tend monthly counseling sessions in a program approved by the
Board.53 The "sexually violent predator" will be responsible for
the cost of the counseling, unless the offender can prove finan-
cial inability to pay.' In that situation, the parole office re-
sponsible for monitoring the offender will pay for the cost of the
counseling.55
In summary, only those sex offenders deemed "sexually vio-
lent predators" will be subject to Pennsylvania's community
notification law. "Sexually violent predators" are those sex of-
fenders that the Board and the courts determine are most likely
to repeat their sex crimes. All other sex offenders will be subject
to the registration requirements of Pennsylvania's statute. In
this respect, the statute is similar to New Jersey's Megan's Law.
NEW JERSEY'S COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAW-MEGAN'S LAW
Although Pennsylvania used New Jersey's community notifi-
cation law-Megan's Law5s-as a model for Pennsylvania's stat-
ute, 7 Pennsylvania's statute is by no means identical to Meg-
an's Law."5 In fact, Pennsylvania's statute is quite different
50. Id. § 9799.1(2), (3), (5).
51. Id. § 9799.4(a).
52. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 559, § 9799.4(a).
53. Id. The statute does not indicate how long the "sexually violent predator"
must undergo monthly counseling.
54. Id.
55. Id. It is important to note that the proposed legislation does not provide
the necessary funding for covering the counseling costs of indigent sex offenders.
56. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11.
57. See Cattabiani, supra note 11, at A-1 (explaining that delays in passing
the legislation were due, in part, to lawmakers keeping a close eye on continuing
legal challenges to New Jersey's Megan's Law).
58. Many provisions of Pennsylvania's statute, especially the terminology
adopted, mirror provisions of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program Act (the "Violent Crime Control
Act"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (West 1995), which is part of the thirty billion dollar
omnibus crime package signed by President Clinton on September 13, 1994. John
Aloysius Farrel, Clinton Signs Crime Bill at White House, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14,
1994, at A-1. The Violent Crime Control Act requires States to develop registration
and verification requirements almost identical to those found in Pennsylvania's stat-
ute. 42 U.S.C.. § 14071(a)-(c). The federal legislation provides that states may re-
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from Megan's Law in many important respects.
Under Megan's Law, after a sex offender has been convicted of
a particular sex offense but before release from custody, the
prosecutors from the county in which the registrant is expected
to reside and the county in which the offender was convicted
must determine whether the offender poses a low, moderate, or
high risk of committing a repeated sex crime." If the risk of re-
offense is low, or Tier 1, only law enforcement agencies receive
information about the offender's release from custody. 0 If the
risk of re-offense is moderate, or Tier 2, law enforcement agen-
cies, schools, and religious and youth organizations receive in-
formation.61 If the offender poses a high risk of re-offense, or
Tier 3, the above parties and the general public likely to encoun-
ter the offender receive information.62 This review process,
which does not allow for the participation of any professionals
with training in the behavior and treatment of sex offenders, is
not subject to judicial review." This is in stark contrast to the
provisions of Pennsylvania's statute."
Another important difference between Megan's Law and
Pennsylvania's statute involves the applicability of each law.
Whereas Pennsylvania's statute provides that the community
notification provisions only apply to "sexually violent predators"
who commit crimes after the legislation's effective date, 5
Megan's law has full retroactive applicability.6 All convicted
offenders, without regard to the date of their crime or conviction,
are subject to the community notification provisions of Megan's
Law if they fall within one of the three risk groups.
Even though Megan's Law only became law on October 31,
1994, several New Jersey courts have already been forced to
examine the constitutionality of the law." The plaintiffs in
lease information about sex offenders to the community when necessary to protect
the public. Id. States have until September 13, 1997 to develop registration guide-
lines mandated by the Violent Crime Control Act or face the loss of federal funding.
Id.




63. A recent Supreme Court of New Jersey decision, Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d
367 (N.J. 1995), now subjects the review process to judicial review.
64. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the judi-
cial review provisions of Pennsylvania's statute.
65. See supra note 27 and accompanying text for the relevant applicability
provisions of Pennsylvania's statute.
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2a, :7-6.
67. See Doe (holding that the community notification provisions of Megan's
Law are not a form of punishment and therefore withstand constitutional scrutiny);
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these cases, sex offenders subject to the community notification
provisions of the law, have attacked Megan's Law on two impor-
tant grounds: the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution s and the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment as set forth in the Eighth Amendment. 9
In Artway v. Attorney General," the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey found the retroactive appli-
cation of the Tiers 2 and 3 community notification provisions of
Megan's Law unconstitutional under an Ex Post Facto Clause
analysis.71 The district court also addressed the plaintiff's
Eighth Amendment claim, but declined to rule on this argument
because of its decision regarding the ex post facto argument. 2
Even though the Artway decision is primarily concerned with
the retroactive application of Megan's Law, the court's opinion
represents a careful study regarding the various constitutional
weaknesses of community notification laws.
A jury found Alexander Artway ("Artway") guilty of sodomy in
Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding that the com-
munity notification provisions of Megan's Law are a form of punishment that violate
the constitutional protection against ex post facto laws), appeal docketed, No. 51-95
(3d Cir. Oct. 17, 1995); Diaz v. Whitman, No. 94, slip op. at 9 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 1995)
(granting a preliminary injunction against implementing the community notification
provisions of Megan's Law based on an ex post facto argument).
68. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The United States Constitution provides
that "W[n]o . . .ex post facto Law shall be passed." Id. New Jersey's Constitution also
contains a similar provision: "[Tihe Legislature shall not pass any . . .ex post facto
law." N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 3. An ex post facto law is defined as "a law
passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively
changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed." BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 580 (6th ed. 1990). See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)
(holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause also encompasses laws that aggravate a
crime, or make it greater than it was when committed).
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The United States Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." Id. New Jersey's Constitution contains a similar
provision:
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not be imposed, and
cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. It shall not be cruel and
unusual punishment to impose the death penalty on a person convicted of
purposely or knowingly causing death or purposely or knowingly causing seri-
ous bodily injury resulting in death who committed the homicidal act by his
own conduct or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offence
by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value.
N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 12.
70. 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 51-95 (3d Cir. Oct.
17, 1995). It is possible that the Third Circuit's decision regarding New Jersey's
appeal of the district court's decision may not be published for at least one year.
Telephone Interview with Clerk of Court, United States Court of Appeals, Third
Circuit, Phila., Pa. (Oct. 19, 1995).
71. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 692.
72. Id. at 679, 683.
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1971 and in 1975 sentenced him to a maximum twenty years
imprisonment.73 At Artway's sentencing, the trial judge charac-
terized Artway's conduct as "repetitive and compulsive."74
Artway was released from custody in 1993 upon completion of
his sentence.75
Because Artway's conduct at the time of his sentencing was
found to be "repetitive and compulsive," Artway was subject to
the provisions of Megan's Law even though he was convicted of
a sex crime twenty-three years prior to the law's enactment."
Artway challenged the constitutionality of Megan's Law based
on several arguments, the two most important being the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the United States Constitution and the prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment as set forth in the
Eighth Amendment.77
The court first enumerated the standards for addressing the
above constitutional attacks, beginning with an analysis of the
73. Id. at 668. Artway was sentenced in 1975 because he was a fugitive from
justice from the Hme of his conviction until his sentencing. Id. at 668 ni.
74. Id. at 668. Artway never challenged the determination made at sentencing.
Id. He was fist imprisoned at the New Jersey State Prison Farm, the Diagnostic
Unit, where he was to receive special treatment for his compulsive, sexual behavior.
Id. In 1978, Artway was transferred to the Rahway State Prison after it was deter-
mined that he lacked the proper involvement and participation in the treatment pro-
gram. Id.
75. Id.
76. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 688-70. Ripeness was a potential issue in
Artway's challenge because he had not yet been subject to the notification provisions
of Megan's Law. Id. at 670. However, because Artway was required to register with
authorities prior to midnight on the date of the court's decision (February 28, 1995)
or face prosecution for a fourth degree felony, the court decided that Artway's claim
was ripe for judicial determination. Id.
77. Id. at 671. Artway also made the following constitutional claims: the con-
stitutional right to privacy, the prohibition against Bills of Attainder, and the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has, in a series of holdings culminating in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973), recognized an individual's right to protect
certain private matters from public scrutiny.
The United States Constitution provides that "[no State shall ...pass any
Bill of Attainder." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. A bill of attainder is any legisla-
tive act that applies to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 165 (6th ed. 1990).
The United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be . . .sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Known as the Double Jeopardy Clause, this portion of the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibits the federal government from punishing citizens a second time for the
same offense for which they had previously been punished. See United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-50 (1989) (holding that a defendant who has already been
punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanc-
tion that operates as a deterrent or retribution without violating the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause).
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Ex Post Facto Clause.78 The court noted that the Framers of
the Constitution intended to prevent the prospect of prior inno-
cent conduct being rendered criminal by subsequent
enactments.79 The court recognized that a very early United
States Supreme Court case, Calder v. Bull,80 is still controlling
precedent in ex post facto analyses."
The district court noted that Calder extended the Ex Post
Facto Clause to include laws that inflict a greater punishment
than the punishment originally associated with the crime. 2
Furthermore, the court noted that this analysis focuses on
whether the legislative aim was to punish the individual for past
activity." In other words, if Megan's Law is punitive, and if it
inflicts a greater punishment-community notification-than the
punishment originally associated with the crime when commit-
ted-imprisonment-then Megan's Law is unconstitutional for
violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The central inquiry for the Artway court was whether Megan's
Law is punitive or regulatory. The New Jersey legislature de-
clared that its intention in passing Megan's Law was to enact a
regulatory law that would merely distribute information to cer-
tain segments of the community." When the legislature's stat-
ed purpose is to enact a procedural rather than a punitive law,
as is the case with Megan's Law, the court recognized that it
must still examine the law's effects to determine whether the
statute operates as a form of punishment."5 To assist itself in
this analysis, the court followed criteria set forth by additional
Supreme Court precedent, known as the "Kennedy criteria.""5
The court noted that the non-exclusive list of factors to be ap-
plied in determining whether legislation is punitive includes:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence,
78. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 672.
79. Id. The court emphasized the fact that the Framers were responding to
the abuses of British rule. Id.
80. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
81. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 671.
82. Id. at 672.
83. Id.
84. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1(a).
85. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 672.
86. Id. at 673 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (hold-
ing that statutes divesting Americans of their citizenship for leaving or remaining




whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned. .... "
The district court then examined the constitutional standards
used when reviewing claims based on the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment." First, the
court recognized that, as with ex post facto claims, the court
must determine whether the statute constitutes punishment by
using the Kennedy criteria. 9 The court then stated that if the
statute is found to be punitive, it must determine whether the
punishment is "cruel and unusual."9" The court noted that the
parameters for "cruel and unusual" focus on whether the penalty
accords with "the dignity of man" and whether the punishment is
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime."
After setting forth the above standards for reviewing ex post
facto and Eighth Amendment claims, the court then applied them
to the specific provisions of Megan's Law. The court first ad-
dressed the ex post facto claim and specifically addressed each
element of the Kennedy criteria."
The court found that the community notification provisions of
Megan's Law constitute an affirmative disability or restraint
because they may adversely affect an offender's employability
and association with neighbors.9 3 The court also determined that
87. Id. at 674 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 677-78. See supra note 69 for the text of the Eighth Amendment.
89. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 678.
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) and Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)). In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the Supreme
Court set forth a three-pronged test to be used in evaluating whether or not the
punishment is proportionate to the crime: "(1) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions." Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92. However, in a later case, the Court
was divided in its lack of continued support for the Solem criteria. See Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (holding that imposition of a mandatory life
sentence in prison without possibility of parole and without any consideration of
mitigating factors does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment). Currently, it
appears that courts applying Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
analyses react only to severe harshness bearing no relation to the gravity of the un-
derlying offense. See Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 679.
92. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 688.
93. Id. at 689. To counter the argument that community notification does not
constitute a disability because the information is available to the public through
court records, the court noted that community notification laws go much further
than making information available. Id. The court argued that community notification
laws provide active public dissemination, rather than mere access for vigilant mem-
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the public dissemination of information regarding an individual's
past criminal record has been historically regarded as punish-
ment and is only applied to individuals after a finding of criminal
intent. 4 The court then determined that Megan's Law was de-
signed to promote at least one of the traditional aims of punish-
ment-deterrence. 5 Based on this analysis, the court found
Megan's Law to be punitive in nature,96 and therefore declared
its retroactive application an unconstitutional violation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. 7
Because the court found Megan's Law to be unconstitutional
under its ex post facto analysis, the court did not apply the provi-
sions of Megan's Law to Artway's Eighth Amendment and other
constitutional claims. However, the district court repeatedly re-
ferred to the community notification provisions of Megan's Law
bers of the community. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court noted that the very nature and function of Megan's Law was
to deter re-offense by sex offenders through heightened police and public awareness.
Id.
96. Id. at 692. Because community notification laws are less common than sex
offender registration laws, only a handful of cases have litigated the issues surround-
ing community notification laws and whether they represent forms of punishment. In
fact, one court has found retroactive community notification laws to be an uncon-
stitutional violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See State v. Babin, 637 So. 2d 814,
824 (La. Ct. App.) (holding that Louisiana's community notification law is unconstitu-
tional because it is punitive and violates the Ex Post Facto Clause), writ denied, 664
So. 2d 649 (La. 1994). But see Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 388 (N.J. 1995) (holding
that New Jersey's Megan's Law is constitutional because it is regulatory in nature
and not punitive); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1072 (Wash. 1994) (holding that
Washington's community notification law is constitutional because it does not repre-
sent a form of punishment).
Registration statutes that do not include community notification provisions
have been almost universally sustained in the face of attacks that the laws are
forms of punishment and thus subject to constitutional scrutiny. See State v. Noble,
829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992) (holding that requiring sex offenders to register
with police upon release from custody is not a form of punishment); People v. Ad-
ams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. 1991) (resulting in the same holding as Noble). But
see Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1385 (D. Alaska 1994) (holding that Alaska's
sex offender registration law is a form of punishment and therefore is an unconstitu-
tional violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause); In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 222 (Cal.
1983) (holding that California's sex offender registration law is a form of punishment
and therefore is an unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment's protection
against cruel and unusual punishment).
97. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 692. An important public policy obstacle has re-
cently surfaced that further complicates the viability of New Jersey's Megan's Law.
See Robert Hanley, "Megan's Law" Leaves New Jersey Lawyers in a Tough Spot,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1995, at B5. A significant number of New Jersey lawyers is
threatening not to represent sex offenders pro bono during the community notifica-
tion review process. Id. Some members of the New Jersey Bar fear that the appeals
could last up to five days, require long preparation and involve appeals to higher
courts, and force lawyers to pay for expert witnesses. Id. In the words of the New
Jersey Bar Association president: "I guess you could call it a strike." Id.
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as a "lifelong branding and albatross" that could adversely affect
an offender's life after the offender's prison sentence has end-
ed."5 Furthermore, the court noted that community notification
could permanently affect an offender's employability, thus forever
hampering the offender's ability to return to a normal, private,
law-abiding life.9 Given this language, it is quite possible that
the district court would have found the community notification
provisions of Megan's Law to be against "the dignity of man" and
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime, and thus in violation of
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.
PENNSYLVANIA'S COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAW IN LIGHT OF
ARTWAY
It is obvious that the Artway decision is not controlling prece-
dent on Pennsylvania's courts."' It is of some importance, how-
ever, that the United States District Court for New Jersey is part
of the Third Circuit, the same circuit that encompasses
Pennsylvania.'0 ' For this reason, the Artway decision deserves
important consideration by anyone interested in the viability of
Pennsylvania's community notification law.
This comment has noted the important differences between
Pennsylvania's statute and New Jersey's Megan's Law.0 2 One
of those differences is the applicability provisions of the two
laws.' In fact, the Pennsylvania legislature seemed to realize
that the retroactive applicability of community notification laws
could run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause.'O° Unlike New Jer-
98. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 689.
99. Id. at 688-89.
100. See Cianfrani v. Johns-Manville Corp., 482 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984) (holding that in the absence of a ruling from the United States Supreme
Court, the decision of a federal intermediate appellate panel is not binding on Penn-
sylvania courts); Commonwealth v. Rundle, 201 A.2d 615, 623 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964)
(holding that decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on state courts even
though a federal question is involved).
101. See Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281, 283 (Pa. 1991) (stating that
decisions by federal courts, although not mechanically applicable to state law issues,
carry persuasive weight as guideposts).
102. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text for several differences be-
tween Pennsylvania's statute and New Jersey's Megan's Law.
103. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the appli-
cability.
104. A strong argument can be made that Pennsylvania's House of Representa-
tive had access to the Artway decision when it made its revisions to Senate Bill 7,
which eventually was enacted into Pennsylvania's statute. The Artway decision re-
garding the retroactive application of New Jersey's Megan's Law was filed on Febru-
ary 28, 1995, the same day Pennsylvania's Senate passed Senate Bill 7. Section
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sey, which subjects all sex offenders, regardless of the date of
their crimes or convictions, to the community notification provi-
sions of Megan's Law, Pennsylvania's statute only applies to sex
offenders who commit a punishable offense after the effective
date of the legislation. In recognizing this important consider-
ation, Pennsylvania's legislature effectively created a community
notification law that is immune from an Ex Post Facto Clause
attack.
The Pennsylvania legislature, however, did not create a com-
munity notification law that is immune from a constitutional
attack based on the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment."5 Pennsylvania's statute, and any other
similar laws that release an individual's past criminal record to
segments of the general public, are punitive laws that are not in
accordance with "the dignity of man" and are "grossly dispropor-
tionate" to the punishable crimes. Simply put, Pennsylvania's
statute represents an unconstitutional violation of a sex
offender's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
As the Artway decision correctly indicated, there is a two-
pronged analysis used to determine whether a law violates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment."°c First, a court must determine whether the law in
question can be categorized as "punishment.""7 If a court deter-
mines that the law is punitive, it must then decide whether the
law constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Pennsylvania's statute is punitive in nature because it meets
the requirements of the Kennedy criteria.' Even though the
Pennsylvania legislature declared that the statute should "not be
construed as punitive,""° a court must look to the effect of the
law to determine whether in fact it is punitive."0 This is the
9799.2 of the original version of Senate Bill 7, as passed by the Senate, provided
that the community notification provisions would apply to offenders released on or
after January 1, 1996, which would have clearly violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Because Artway declared the retroactive applicability of Megan's Law unconstitution-
al, Pennsylvania's House of Representatives wisely changed Senate Bill 7 to make
an ex post facto attack null and void. If the House of Representatives did have
access to the Artway decision when making its amendments, that is tacit recognition
that the Artway decision and its analysis of community notification laws carries
significant importance.
105. The Pennsylvania Constitution states that: 'Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted." PA. CONST.
art. 1, § 13.
106. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 677-79.
107. Id. at 678.
108. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ken-
nedy criteria which are used to determine whether a law is punitive in nature.
109. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 553, § 9791(b).
110. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990) (stating that by simply
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exact analysis that the Artway court performed in finding that
New Jersey's community notification law is indeed punitive.'
Pennsylvania's community notification law is similar enough to
New Jersey's Megan's Law to also be considered punitive in na-
ture. First, Pennsylvania's community notification law represents
an affirmative disability to or restraint of individuals subject to
its provisions. The public dissemination of information about
"sexually violent predators" will subject those individuals to con-
tinuous police scrutiny and community suspicion. Furthermore,
notifying segments of the community about a sex offender's re-
lease from custody will forever impair that individual's employ-
ability and ability to return to a normal life. Such an adverse
effect on an individual's future can only lead to the conclusion
that Pennsylvania's statute will act as an affirmative disability
or restraint.
The public dissemination of an individual's past criminal activ-
ity, which is the main thrust of Pennsylvania's statute, has been
historically regarded as punishment.' The Artway decision
noted the traditional Judeo-Christian story of the "Mark of Cain"
as perhaps the earliest example where public notification clearly
operated as a form of punishment."' In fact, virtually every so-
ciety has, at some point in its history, used the public dissemina-
tion of an individual's wrongdoing to exact punishment."
As further evidence that Pennsylvania's statute is punitive in
nature, the law will only affect those individuals who have been
convicted of crimes that require a degree of intent or a criminal
mens rea." Each of the statutory offenses that an offender
must first be convicted of before being labeled a "sexually violent
offender" requires a finding of criminal intent.16
labeling a law as "procedural," a legislature does not immunize the law from scruti-
ny); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167-69 (1963) (stating that when
there is doubt as to whether legislation was intended to be regulatory or punitive, a
court must make the determination based on certain criteria as to the effect of the
legislation).
111. See Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 688-92.
112. Id. at 689-90.
113. Id. at 689. Cain killed his brother Abel out of jealousy. Genesis 4:8 (King
James). The Lord physically marked Cain so that all who encountered Cain would
identify him as the murderer of his brother. Id. at 4:15.
114. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 688 n.14. See also Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417
(1885) (listing and examining different forms of punishment that inflict public igno-
miny); John A. Brilliant, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Mod-
ern Probation Conditions, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1357, 1361-62 (1989) (arguing that late
oriental and classical societies, as well as the Romans, French, and English, devel-
oped branding as a means of public notification for criminal activity).
115. "Mens rea" is defined as a guilty or wrongful purpose that involves guilty
knowledge and willfulness. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990).
116. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
1996
Duquesne Law Review
Finally, Pennsylvania's community notification statute clearly
promotes deterrence, which is one of the traditional aims of pun-
ishment."7 As part of the legislative findings and declaration of
policy, the statute itself states that the public dissemination of
information is intended to prevent "sexually violent predators"
from committing repeat sex crimes."' Although "deterrence" is
not the stated motive behind the proposed legislation, it is the
legislature's hidden motive in light of two important assumptions
found in the legislation. First, the legislature declared that "sexu-
ally violent predators" pose a high risk of committing repeat sex
crimes upon release from custody.' Second, the legislature de-
clared that the public at large will be able to deter future crimes
by implementing prevention and protection plans with the infor-
mation it is provided under the statute. 2 ' The obvious motive
of Pennsylvania's statute is to deter "sexually violent predators"
from committing future sex crimes by allowing the general public
to take appropriate precautions.
Even though Pennsylvania's community notification law must
be considered punitive in nature, it must also represent a form of
cruel and unusual punishment before it can be declared unconsti-
tutional under the Eighth Amendment. As previously mentioned,
defining the parameters of what is "cruel and unusual" basically
involves a finding that the punishment is severely harsh and has
no relation to the gravity of the underlying crime.'" If the pun-
crimes that an offender must first be convicted of before being labeled as a "sexually
violent predator."
117. The two main philosophical justifications for punishment are deterrence
and retribution. See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND JUSTICE 1336, 1338-41 (S.H. Kadish ed. 1983); PLATO, THE COLLECTED DIA-
LOGUES 321 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Lane Cooper trans., Prince-
ton University Press, 1963).
118. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 552-53, § 9791.
119. Id. § 9791(a)(2). The question of whether sex offenders have a higher rate
of recidivism than other criminals is far from being an established scientific fact. See
e.g., Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Sexual Psychopathy: Washington State's Sexual
Predator Legislation, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 809, 811-16 (1992) (arguing that
sex offenders are no more likely to commit repeated offenses than other categories of
criminals). Scheingold notes one study that indicated that robbers had a higher re-
arrest rate than sex offenders, and murderers had a re-arrest rate almost equal to
that of sex offenders. Id. at 812.
120. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 552-53, § 9791(a)(1). This assumption is also ques-
tionable given the fact that recent studies indicate that mothers, fathers, and other
family members make up the largest group of sex offenders. Jeanette Krebs, Megan's
Law Sparks Debate, Bill Won't Protect Kids from All Sex Offenders, SUNDAY PATRIOT-
NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), Oct. 1, 1995, at B-1. Some argue that the threat of the
whole family being the object of public humiliation will deter families from reporting
the crimes in the first place. Id.
121. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 679.
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ishment is not in accordance with "the dignity of man" and is
"grossly disproportionate" to the underlying crime, the punish-
ment violates the Eighth Amendment's protection from cruel and
unusual punishment.'
The community notification provisions of Pennsylvania's stat-
ute represent cruel and unusual punishment because the public
dissemination of information will act as a lifelong badge of humil-
iation. Such perpetual punishments are against "the dignity of
man."22 Through the operation of Pennsylvania's statute, a sex
offender will never be able to return to a normal life, even after
the offender has completed a prison sentence. Furthermore, the
offender's employability will be forever impaired.
The drafters of Pennsylvania's statute implied that sex crimes
are so horrific that sex offenders have a diminished expectation
of privacy and do not deserve to lead normal lives.2 4 Sex crimes
are horrific, but they are no more tragic than the crimes commit-
ted by a cold-blooded killer who shoots a defenseless cashier in
the back of the head to eliminate a witness to a robbery. There is
no logical reason why communities should be notified of only re-
leased sex offenders and not all criminals who are released from
custody. Responsible parents, according to the logic of Pennsyl-
vania's statute, should demand information about released mur-
derers and arsonists, as well as released sex offenders. Murder-
ers and arsonists are just as dangerous to the public as sex of-
fenders, but there are no community notification laws for all
categories of criminals because lifelong public humiliation is a
form of punishment that does not comport with "the dignity of
man."
'
In Trop v. Dulles,2' the Supreme Court stated that the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishment" centers on the concept of an "evolving standard of
decency that marks the progress of a maturing society."'26 Al-
though public humiliation was an acceptable form of punishment
122. Id. at 678.
123. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (stating that keep-
ing a criminal forever under the shadow of a crime is oppressive and represents a
deprivation of essential liberty). It is important to note that the defendant in Weems,
after being released from his prison sentence, was not able to change his domicile
without notifying and receiving permission from local police authorities, a punish-
ment similar to that inflicted by community notification laws. Weems, 217 U.S. at
366. In Weems, the defendant was convicted of falsifying a cash book of the Bureau
of Coast Guard and Transportation of the United States Government of the Philip-
pine Islands. Id. at 357.
124. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 553, § 9791(a)(5).
125. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
126. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
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in the colonial United States, it is a form of punishment that no
longer comports with "the dignity of man" in a mature soci-
ety.
127
The community notification provisions of Pennsylvania's stat-
ute are punitive in nature and the public dissemination of a sex
offender's information will act as a lifelong badge of shame that
will forever prevent the offender from returning to a normal, law-
abiding life. Due to its never-ending effect, Pennsylvania's stat-
ute represents a form of punishment that violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THAT WEAKEN PENNSYLVANIA'S
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAW
In addition to the questionable constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's community notification law, there are two impor-
tant public policy considerations that reflect weaknesses in the
legislation's ability to protect communities from repeat sex of-
fenders. There is evidence that a large number of released sex
offenders subject to community notification laws report false
addresses or never register with the proper authorities. Commu-
nity notification laws also encourage members of the community
to take the law into their own hands, resulting in an increase of
violent crimes while ineffectively limiting repeated sex crimes.
In order for Pennsylvania's statute to accomplish the goal of
protecting communities from repeat sex offenders, it requires the
cooperation of released sex offenders. Upon release from custody,
the "sexually violent predator" must register all current address-
es, and any address changes, with the Pennsylvania State Po-
lice.'28 However, critics of Megan's Law have pointed out that a
sex offender could easily defeat the entire purpose of the law by
127. The cruelty of public humiliation is best described in the following passage
from Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter:
But the point which drew all eyes, and, as it were transfigured the wear-
er-so that both men and women, who had been familiarly acquainted with
Hester Prynne, were now impressed as if they beheld her for the first
time,-was that SCARLET LETTER, so fantastically embroidered and illumi-
nated upon her bosom. It had the effect of a spell, taking her out of the ordi-
nary relations with humanity, and enclosing her in a sphere by herself
NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 42 (Amaranth Press ed. 1985) (em-
phasis added). See also Michelle Pia Jerusalem, Note, A Framework For Post-Sen-
tence Sex Offender Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the
Public's "Right" to Know, 48 VAND. L. REV. 219, 224-27 (1995) (discussing the histor-
ical development and subsequent rejection of humiliation as a form of punishment).
128. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 555-56, §§ 9795(a), 9795(bX2), 9796(a). Any of-
fender who fails to follow the registration requirements commits a felony of the
third degree. Id. §§ 9795(d), 9796(e).
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simply not registering with the authorities upon release or by
registering under a false address.' One New Jersey attorney
has admitted that some of his clients will not register unless
forced to do so by a court order.' s° Recent studies indicate that
a significant number of released sex offenders are failing to regis-
ter their address information with authorities, rendering commu-
nity notification laws useless. 13' To compound the problem, po-
lice departments often do not have enough resources to track
down released sex offenders who have not registered.'3 2 One
law enforcement official admitted that when faced with investing
time and resources in an ongoing criminal investigation or track-
ing down an unregistered sex offender, attention will be devoted
to the ongoing criminal investigation.'"
Although the Pennsylvania legislature believes that the public
will use the information released under Pennsylvania's statute in
a constructive and legal manner to safeguard communities from
repeat sex offenders, the truth is that Pennsylvania's community
notification law may turn some law-abiding individuals into vigi-
lantes. Although the legislation calls for the Pennsylvania State
Police to develop guidelines on how communities should properly
use the released information,"M reality dictates that a book of
guidelines will do little to quell the fears of a neighborhood
stirred into a frenzy over the release of an individual labeled a
"sexually violent predator."
In fact, one Pennsylvania man knows firsthand what the com-
munity notification provisions of New Jersey's Megan's Law can
do to a community susceptible to irrational fears. Tom Vicari, a
truck driver from Allentown, Pennsylvania, spent the night of
January 9, 1995 at his fiancee's cousin's house in nearby
Phillipsburg, New Jersey, because the heat in his Allentown
apartment was not working.'" Also staying at the cousin's
129. Bruno Tedeschi, Critics Decry Efforts to Register Molesters, Claim Volun-
tary Aspect Makes Law Toothless, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Sept. 22, 1994, at
B-1.
130. Steve Adubato Jr., Megan's Law Seems Simple But Is It Workable?, RE-
CORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Nov. 8, 1994, at D-7.
131. Tomas Guillen, Thousands of Sex Offenders Now Registered-Data Survey
Finds 73% Compliance by Those in Most Serious Cases, SEArrLE TIMES, July 7,
1991, at B-3. A survey conducted in Washington, which enacted its community notifi-
cation law-the Community Protection Act-in 1990, found that almost thirty percent
of released sex offenders failed to register with the proper authorities. Id.
132. Maria Williams, Where Are Sex Offenders-Authorities Say They Lack Re-
sources to Track Them Down, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at A-1.
133. Williams, supra note 132, at A-6.
134. See 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 557-58, § 9799.1(3), (5).
135. Jerome, supra note 1, at 50.
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house that night was the cousin's live-in nephew, Michael Groff,
a recently released sex offender whose name and address was re-
leased to the Phillipsburg community under Megan's Law.'36
Shortly after Vicari fell asleep, he was awakened by an intruder
wearing a black ski mask. 7 Mistaking Vicari as the recently
released sex offender, the intruder began punching and kicking
Vicari, and a second intruder hurled a beer bottle through a win-
dow.138 The intruders were a 52-year-old neighbor and his
son."13 Any law that increases the likelihood of violent crime
while dubiously attempting to prevent future crimes is not a
well-reasoned piece of legislation.
REHABILITATION AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS TO PROTECT
COMMUNITIES FROM REPEAT SEX OFFENDERS
Pennsylvania's community notification law is a "quick fix." Any
legislator who wants to be viewed as "tough on crime" will vote in
favor of a law that leaves it to the community-at-large to solve
the complex problem of repeat sex offenders. In this sense,
Pennsylvania's statute presents a political "win-win" situation.
Curtailing the rights of sex offenders will not cost legislators
important votes in an upcoming election and the statute will not
require lawmakers to dip too deeply into taxpayers' pockets.
But solving the problem of repeat sex offenders is not an issue
that lends itself to a cheap, quick fix. If lawmakers truly want to
protect communities and reduce the number of repeat sex crimes,
they will need to focus on the cause of deviant sexual behavior
and rehabilitate those individuals that display such behavior.
The token measures in the legislation requiring "sexually vio-
lent predators" to attend monthly counseling sessions are
inadequate."4 The monthly counseling sessions are not made a
part of an offender's parole and there are no enforcement provi-
sions that would force the offender to attend the sessions. But
more importantly, requiring an offender to pay the costs of coun-
seling, unless the offender can prove financial inability to do so,




139. Id. The father and son were charged with burglary, assault, conspiracy
and criminal mischief. Id. Vicari made some insightful comments about the effective-
ness of community notification laws: 'This law didn't stop no crime. It created crime.
And what if I'd been killed? I got two children of my own. What would Megan's
Law have done for them? Nothing." Id.
140. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text for the counseling re-
quirements of Pennsylvania's statute.
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fective counseling so the state can avoid paying for more expen-
sive and effective treatment.
For rehabilitation to work as an effective tool in the prevention
of repeat sex crimes, the state must assume the majority of the
cost of treating sex offenders. One possible solution is a relatively
new therapy called "relapse prevention."" This type of therapy
assumes that sex offenders may never be fully cured of their
abnormal sexual behavior, but instead helps sex offenders control
their sexual urges.4 "Relapse prevention" allows sex offenders
to develop empathy for the victims of their crimes by requiring
the offenders to watch videotapes from a victim's perspective,
reading victim accounts of sex crimes, and reenacting the sex
crime while playing the role of the victim."3 This therapy
should take place while the offender is in prison or under a peri-
od of probation. But in order to ensure that a sex offender does
not relapse, appropriate monitoring needs to continue once the
offender is released from therapy. Admittedly, "relapse preven-
tion" represents a solution that many will characterize as being
"soft on crime." More importantly, it will be expensive. But if the
legislature's true goal is to reduce the number of repeat sex of-
fenses, a solution that reaches to the source of the problem, such
as "relapse prevention," will achieve better results than commu-
nity notification.
CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania's sex offender community notification law is an
attempt by the legislature to deal with a real problem. No person
should be the victim of a sex crime, let alone one committed by a
previously convicted sex offender. But a community notification
law will not make Pennsylvania's communities safe from repeat
sex offenders. Because Pennsylvania's statute is punitive in na-
ture and will work as a lifelong social stigma for those offenders
subject to its provisions, it violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment."'" In addi-
tion to constitutional flaws, the community notification provisions
141. Daniel Goleman, Therapies Offer Hope for Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 1992, at C-1. See also Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the
Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey's Megan's Law, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 569,
598-99 (1995) (discussing the benefits of treating sex offenders with "relapse preven-
tion" therapy).
142. Coleman, supra note 141, at C-1.
143. Id. at C-11.
144. See supra notes 105-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the




of Pennsylvania's statute will be meaningless against those of-
fenders who fail to register their addresses with the proper au-
thorities." The proposed legislation also ensures that some cit-
izens will turn into vigilantes, exacting their own form of justice
on recently released sex offenders." To effectively protect com-
munities from repeat sex offenders, the Pennsylvania legislature
should concentrate on implementing better rehabilitative tech-
niques, such as "relapse prevention" therapy, to prevent repeat
sex offenders from acting on their harmful sexual urges in the
first place." 7 A policy centered on the rehabilitation of sexual
offenders will be more expensive than a community notification
law, but a more costly and realistic legislative plan is better than
a "quick fix" that allows Pennsylvania's political leaders to pre-
tend they are "tough on crime."
Michael L. Bell
145. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of how sex
offenders subject to community notification will be able to render the statute useless
by failing to register their addresses or registering false information.
146. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of vigilan-
tism.
147. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of "relapse
prevention" therapy.
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